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Intuitions, particularly judgments of grammaticality, have played an
important role in theoretical linguistics, but the nature of grammati-
cality judgments by second language learners has not received
adequate attention. The present study is an investigation of the
function of grammaticality judgments in second language acquisition.
Two groups of learners of different proficiency levels were asked to
give grammaticality judgments of sentences they had written and of
sentences other students had written. The results were analyzed in
terms of the subjects’ ability to make the appropriate grammaticality
judgments and to correct those sentences they had judged to be
ungrammatical. The results indicate that with increased proficiency
in English, learners move from an overall ability to make general
assessments of grammaticality to an ability to identify and/or correct
particular details. The results of this study are also discussed in terms
of Bialystok’s (1979, 1981) notion of implicit/explicit knowledge and
the general function of metalinguistics awareness in second language
acquisition.
INTRODUCTION
It is widely accepted that the language of second language (L2)
learners, what Selinker (1972) has called “interlanguage,” or what I
shall be referring to as a learner-language (see also Corder’s 1978
“language-learner language”), is a system in its own right. This notion
has been further amplified by Adjemian (1976), Gass and Ard (in
press), Gundel and Tarone (in press), Eckman (in press), and Schmidt
(1980), all of whom have argued that learner-languages are subject to
the constraints on natural languages. If we assume similarity to natural
languages, we would further suppose that they could be investigated
through the same methods as other types of natural languages, for
which a chief methodological device is the use of intuitions of native
speakers. However, this device has been used relatively rarely in
studying L2 learner-languages.
In this article we discuss the significance of intuitions in general as
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well as present results of an experiment in which L2 intuitions were the
subject of investigation. In particular, a major point of interest is the
discovery of how learners evaluate and correct their own utterances.
The implications of this study for the overall development of a
learner’s knowledge of a second language will be discussed.
Grammaticality Judgments
Judgments of grammaticality refer to a speaker’s intuition concern-
ing the nature of a particular utterance. The basic question is whether
or not a given utterance (usually a sentence) is well-formed.
The goal of second language acquisition research is to seek answers
to the question of acquisition itself. Not only do we ask ourselves what
is acquired, but also when, how, and why. While individual research
questions frequently address only limited aspects of the what, the goal
of research is to understand the totality of acquisition. We are
frequently limited by the type of data collection done and hence the
claims that we can make about the process of acquisition. The
complete picture of the what of acquisition must come from examining
a variety of L2 sources, including production, perception, comprehen-
sion, and intuition data. Anything less cannot hope to meet even the
minimal requirement of explanatory adequacy (see Gass 1980a, Tarone
1982).
Given the overwhelming reliance on grammaticality judgments
within theoretical linguistics, it seems somewhat surprising that the L2
acquisition literature is so rarely based on data obtained from this
method. However, there are several reasons why this may be the case.
Schachter, Tyson, and Diffley (1976) speculated. that the paucity of
studies using intuitional data is a reflection of elicitation methodology
used in first language acquisition studies, where judgments of gram-
maticality are often difficult to obtain because the subjects are very
young children. Since L2 acquisition research has followed closely on
the heels of child language studies, the use of intuitional data in our
field has similarly been limited, although clearly the limitations that
apply to children are not necessarily applicable to adults.
There are still other reasons which, perhaps, have greater validity in
justifying the absence of intuitional data in adult second language
acquisition studies, or which may at least provide greater justification
for not maintaining the parallel with theoretical linguistics. By and
large, grammaticality judgments are not asked of naive speakers.
Linguistic theories, in particular generative analyses of languages, are
based primarily on judgments made by professional linguists. When
one utilizes judgments made by linguistically unsophisticated speakers,
and perhaps even linguistically sophisticated ones, one does not always
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find consistency between what speakers do and what they say they do.
The problem may be further compounded when dealing with non-
standard English speakers, since one cannot often be sure just what
variety of language the judgments are being made about—that is, are
they making judgments about the standard, or what they think the
standard is, or about their own dialect? The situation of L2 learners is
not dissimilar since these learners are generally asked for judgments
about the target language and not necessarily about their own learner-
grammar. Despite this, we make inferences from their responses about
the nature of their target language (TL) grammar. In other words, in
the absence of very explicit instructions, L2 learners most likely assume
that they are being asked about what is correct in the language they are
learning. It is difficult to convince learners that their attempts at a
second language form a systematic entity, which would pave the way
for direct questions about their learner-grammar.
A third justification for the limited use of grammaticality judgments
as a means of data collection in L2 research concerns the learner’s
overall ability in the target language. When asking for judgments from
adult native speakers (even linguistically unsophisticated ones), one
can assume that most of the time there is at least an approximate
equivalence in a speaker’s ability to produce utterances, to comprehend
utterances, to parse utterances, and to judge utterances. For L2 learn-
ers this is not necessarily the case since there is often a large discrepan-
cy in one’s abilities in these areas. Furthermore, Carroll, Bever, and
Pollack (1981) investigated native speaker intuitions of sentence re-
latedness and showed that linguistic intuitions can be manipulated by
altering the conditions under which sentence pairs are presented. The
implications of their study are far-reaching in that the one-to-one
relationship between grammatical structures and intuitions is called
into question. Nonetheless, they suggest that the intuitive process can
itself be the object of inquiry:
. . . linguistic intuitions have a dual systematic nature. On the one hand,
they can be basic and primitive manifestations of the grammatical knowl-
edge speakers share; but on the other hand, they are complex behavioral
performances that can be properly understood and adequately interpreted
only by a comprehensive analysis (Carroll, Bever, and Pollack 1981:380).
In fact we claim that linguistic intuitions of L2 learners are important
not only for the information they reflect about learners’ grammatical
knowledge, but also because of the information they can provide
about L2 development and the ways in which language knowledge is
organized.
Despite the lack of attention that grammaticality judgments have
received in the L2 literature, their importance is beginning to be
recognized. Corder (1973) originally discussed the value of adding this
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type of data to the more commonly collected data, which he called
“textual data,” these latter coming from utterances which learners
themselves have produced. And recently, several L2 researchers have
used intuitional data in their work. Bailey and Madden (1980), Ioup
and Kruse (1977), Schmidt (1980), Gass (1979), Bialystok (1979, 1981),
and others have all made use of this type of data in attempting to
understand the process of acquisition (see Chaudron, undated, for an
extensive overview of research in this area).
Although the ultimate goal of L2 research is to determine the nature
of non-primary language acquisition (Adjemian 1981), “the immediate
goal of research in this field is the description of the grammatical and
phonological system which underlies learner performance” (Tarone
1982:70). However, if we limit the scope of our research to descriptions
of the learner’s grammar, well-documented phenomena such as avoid-
ance (Gass 1980b, Schachter 1974, Kleinmann 1977) and recent concep-
tions of language transfer as espoused by Kellerman (1979, in press;
Zobl 1980) will not manifest themselves in the data.
Just what information, then, can grammaticality, or intuitional judg-
ments, as they are frequently called, provide us with? As mentioned
above, they reflect information about a learner”s knowledge, either
static or developing, of the target language and the organization of that
knowledge. However, there is yet an additional aspect to be consid-
ered. The ability to think about language has sometimes been called
metalinguistic awareness, an ability related to a greater facility with
language. Metalinguistic activities encompass a wide range of phenom-
ena, of which linguistic intuitions (including grammaticality judgments)
are one part.
Metalinguistic Awareness
With this information as background, let us now turn to a considera-
tion of metalinguistic awareness, what it is and its significance in doing
L2 acquisition research. From Bewell and Straw (1981) we find various
definitions of this term. Bateson refers to it as “those explicit or implicit
messages where the subject of discourse is the language” (1976:127).
Cazden says that it is “the ability to make language forms opaque and
to attend to them in and for themselves” (1976:603). Another view
comes from Fowles and Glanz, who say it is “the ability to manipulate
language as an object” (1977:432). There are also differing degrees of
awareness referred to by some authors. The common factor in all of
this is that we are dealing with some ability on the part of the speaker
to view language (or at least a particular aspect of it) in and of itself
and to perform certain operations on it. In this sense, grammaticality
judgments are crucial in determining this ability. Other evidence sug-
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gested for the existence and use of metalinguistic awareness comes
from word games, puns, recognition of ambiguities, and perhaps even
translation tasks (Sharwood Smith, personal communication).
For second language learners the ability to think and talk about
language might involve abstract analyses of a number of different
types. For example, it might include 1) analyses of their own language,
2) a comparison between their native language (NL) and the target
language, 3) a comparison between their native language and other
languages previously learned, or even 4) a comparison between the
target language and other languages previously learned.
Clearly, the ability to think about language as an abstract entity and
to make cross-linguistic comparisons is manifested in the now familiar
strategy of avoidance (Schachter 1974) or in Kellerman’s (in press)
concept of psychotypology. Presumably both presuppose a choice on
the part of the learner about which linguistic forms will be successful in
the target language, or which forms will be difficult. Moreover,
metalinguistic awareness has been found to be a facilitator of acquisi-
tion. For example, it develops earlier and more rapidly in children with
more than one language (Burling 1973, Sharwood Smith 1981, Slobin
1978). Heeschen (1978) suggests that there may be increased linguistic
reflectiveness in multilingual situations regardless of whether or not the
society is literate. In other words, there is some relationship between
knowledge of languages and a greater amount of metalinguistic
awareness.
According to Bewell and Straw, “there is strong evidence to suggest
that a relationship exists between the development of metalinguistic
awareness and language learning” (1981: 117). Initially, self-correction
and restatement of utterances may serve to aid the communication
process. Word games, puns, and recognitions of ambiguities surface at
a later stage (for a full discussion, see Clark 1978).
It is our claim that a similar relationship holds for second language
Iearning. 1 metalinguistic awareness has an important function for
second language learners, allowing them to make comparisons between
NL and TL, self-correct, and perhaps even monitor their output.
Investigating a learner’s ability to judge grammaticality is therefore
essential to an understanding of a learner’s development.
1 metalinguistic abilities in children have frequently been related to their abilities to develop
reading and writing skills and not to their abilities to learn how to speak. That is, all children,
regardless of their metalinguistic abilities, acquire native competence. However, as we point
out later in this article, metalinguistic abilities do serve a communicative function for children,
as Sinclair, Jarvella, and Levelt (1978) show. Furthermore, “success” in a language is not
restricted to one’s ability to speak and understand a language for, clearly, all non-impaired
children do succeed in this area, but we claim that “success” includes reading and writing
abilities. In this sense, greater metalinguistic abilities relate to greater language success.
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Obtaining Grammaticality Judgments in L2 Research
Generally, in adult L2 acquisition, intuitional data are obtained by
means of a paper and pencil task. Learners are asked to judge the
grammaticality of certain test sentences, usually grammatical and
ungrammatical versions of the particular structure the researcher is
gathering information about. There is considerable variability among
researchers as to the percentage of grammatical vs. ungrammatical
sentences presented and whether or not the sentences are to be
corrected. Some researchers ask the learners to correct those sentences
which they consider to be incorrect, others underline the particular
structure so as to focus attention on it, and others ask only for responses
about grammaticality.
The test sentences typically used on these tasks are either 1)
sentences actually produced by learners (Schachter et al. 1976, White
1977), 2) sentences designed by the researcher to test specific aspects
of a given structure (Bailey and Madden 1980, Gass 1979, Ioup and
Kruse 1977, Schmidt 1980), or 3) sentences in context designed to test
grammaticality judgments (Arthur 1980). These researchers have hy-
pothesized errors based on a contrastive analysis and then focused on
them in their studies. However, it is important to note that errors
actually produced are not always produced by the same person who is
making judgments about them. For example, in the Schachter et al.
(1976) study, the errors are produced and judged within a language
group, but not necessarily by the person who produced them. Under-
lying this means of formulating a grammaticality judgment task is the
implicit assumption that there is an Arabic-English interlanguage, a
Spanish-English interlanguage, and so forth. In other words, Arabic
speakers learning English all “do” the “same” thing. While this may be
true to some degree, we do not yet know which aspects of one’s NL
will be influential on one’s production of the TL and which will not be.
Nor do we know how uniform this might be across speakers. As
Corder (1973) has noted, theoretically, there may be as many different
interlanguages as there are individuals who speak them.
In this article we will take a closer look at intuitional data, examining
in particular what learners are able to do and how their abilities
progress.
METHOD
The study described here is one in which judgments were elicited
about a learner’s own output. This, of course, is potentially difficult
since learner-languages, unlike natural languages, are in a constant
state of flux or, at least, are much less stable than other natural lan-
guages. Hence, grammaticality judgments were obtained within 24
hours after the sentences were produced.
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The study is based on data from 21 subjects, 13 from an intermediate
ESL class at the English Language Institute of the University of
Michigan, and 8 from an advanced ESL class there. They were all
given an in-class composition on one of two subjects: 1) the method of
English language instruction in their own country, or 2) who they
would like to be if they could be someone else for a day. There was
ample time for students to locate and correct errors. In fact, there was
considerable evidence of correction in the form of erasures and cross-
outs. On the day following the in-class assignment, they were each
given a grammaticality judgment test which consisted of sentences
from each of these four categories:
a. four grammatical sentences from their own compositions
b. four ungrammatical sentences from their own compositions
c. two grammatical sentences from compositions of speakers of lan-
guages other than their own
d. two ungrammatical sentences from compositions of speakers of a
language other than their own.
Hence, ideally, each speaker had 12 sentences (8 of which came
from her/his own composition and 4 from someone else’s). Half in
each category were grammatical and half were ungrammatical. The
sentences were presented to the learners in random order. The subjects
were asked to judge each sentence as being either grammatical or
ungrammatical (the terms good English sentences vs. bad English
sentences were used), and to correct those sentences which they
judged to be ungrammatical so as to make them grammatical.
RESULTS
Because a discussion of these results can become confusing, we have
adopted terminology following Arthur (1980) to make distinctions
concerning the terms grammatical and ungrammatical. We refer to
grammatical/ungrammatical from the learner’s point of view as gram-
matical (L) or ungrammatical (L) respectively, and we refer to gram-
matical/ungrammatical from the perspective of standard English as
grammatical (E)/ungrammatical (E).
There are a number of different measures that can be considered in
analyzing the results of this study. The first one we discuss is consis-
tency. By this we mean, how do learners view their own sentences?
Theoretically, one could hypothesize that all sentences written by a
given learner would be judged grammatical by that learner since
students would not intentionally write ungrammatical sentences (espe-
cially when writing a composition for a teacher). Thus, all the
2 ln some cases it was impossible to obtain the requisite number in categories a and b.
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sentences that the learner wrote (regardless of their actual acceptability
in the target language) would be marked grammatical. This was
clearly not the case, as can be seen in Table 1.
TABLE 1
Percentage of Own Sentences Judged Grammatical
Group 1 (Intermediate) Group 2 (Advanced)
Subject Percentage Native Language Subject Percentage Native Language
1 37.5 Japanese 1 71 Korean
2 87.5 Vietnamese 2 57 Japanese
3 62.5 Korean 3 42.8 Japanese
4 37.5 Japanese 4 85.7 Japanese
5 50 Italian 5 25 Japanese
6 25 Spanish 6 16.7 Japanese
7 37.5 Spanish 7 62.5 Japanese






As displayed in this table, there were many learners who failed to
judge a large number of their own sentences as grammatical. How-
ever, there was quite a range in how individual learners viewed their
sentences. In general, the intermediate students (designated as Group
1) were more consistent in their judgments in that they judged more of
their own sentences grammatical than did the advanced group; how-
ever, due to the large amount of variability, these numbers must be
interpreted with caution.
More interesting are the results regarding accuracy from the point of
view of an English standard. For this we look first at those sentences
which the individual students wrote (that is, categories a and b ). Table
2 illustrates the extent to which the intermediate students (Group 1)
and the advanced students (Group 2) were able to correctly identify
their own sentences as grammatical or ungrammatical.
As can be seen from Table 2, the intermediate group correctly
identified 74.4% of the grammatical (E) sentences, while they correctly
identified 68% of the ungrammatical (E) sentences. The advanced
group correctly identified 66.7% of the grammatical (E) and 68.9% of
the ungrammatical (E) sentences. The intermediate group, then, is
slightly better at identifying the grammatical (E) sentences than at
identifying the ungrammatical (E) sentences. In other words, they
have a better idea of when they are right than they do of when they are
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wrong. The advanced learners have about equal abilities in determin-
ing their own correctness or incorrectness.
TABLE 2
Sentences correctly Identified (From the Perspective of an English Standard) as Either Grammatical
or Ungrammatical, Based on Students’ Own Sentences
Grammatical (E) Ungrammatical (E)
Group 1 (Intermediate) 35/47 74.4% 34/50 68%
Group 2 (Advanced) 18/27 66.7% 20/29 68.9%
In Table 3 we see accuracy (again viewed from the perspective of
the target language) based on those sentences not written by the
students themselves (categories c and d). What is interesting is that in
comparing the results of Tables 2 and 3, accuracy is generally less for
sentences written by speakers of native languages other than their own
than it is for their own sentences. The exception is the advanced
group’s ability to judge the ungrammatical (E) sentences written by
speakers of native languages other than their own. These results are not
surprising, since the sentences of categories c and d are not sentences
about which learners have an internalized rule system. Responses to
their own sentences (categories a and b) consist of responses to
sentences about which they have some knowledge. The other sentences
may or may not represent sentences about which they have knowledge.
In the case of the advanced learners, it seems that the ungrammatical
(E) sentences are sentences about which they have internalized infor-
mation (see Schachter et al. 1976 for a discussion of indeterminate
sentences).
TABLE 3
Sentences Correctly Identified (From the Perspective of an English Standard) as Either Grammatical
or Ungrammatical, Based on Sentences Written by Learners of Other Native Languages
Grammatical (E) Ungrammatical (E)
Group 1 (Intermediate) 17/26 65% 3/26 12%
Group 2 (Advanced) 8/16 50% 14/16 87.5%
An important aspect of a study of this sort is a consideration of the
types of changes learners make on sentences they have judged to be
ungrammatical (L). That is, we now focus our attention on those
sentences which the learners have marked ungrammatical and which
they subsequently changed. To better understand the changes made,
the sentences have been divided into two groups: 1) those which are
grammatical from an English standard, and 2) those which are
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ungrammatical from an English standard. Table 4 shows the types of
changes made (these include only the learners’ own sentences).
Particularly interesting is the fact that when sentences are changed,
the change only rarely affects the actual grammaticality/ungrammati-
cality (E) of the sentence. That is, although these sentences are judged
TABLE 4
Changes Made in Sentences Produced by the Learner and Designated Ungrammatical
Group 1
Grammatical (based on an English standard)
6/8 75% grammatical to grammatical
2/8 25% grammatical to ungrammatical
Ungrammatical (based on an English standard)
26/33 78.8% ungrammatical to ungrammatical
7/33 21.2% ungrammatical to grammatical
Group 2
Grammatical (based on an English standard)
8/10 80% grammatical to grammatical
2/10 20% grammatical to ungrammatical
Ungrammatical (based on an English standard)
12/20 60% ungrammatical to ungrammatical
8/20 40% ungrammatical to grammatical
ungrammatical (L), the changes made do not affect the grammaticality
(E). Grammatical (E) sentences remained grammatical (E), and un-
grammatical (E) sentences remained ungrammatical (E). For the
intermediate group, 6/8, or 75%, of the grammatical sentences remained
grammatical, while 26/33, or 78.8%, of the ungrammatical ones re-
mained ungrammatical. For the advanced group similar results ob-
tained: 8/10, or 80%, remained grammatical while 12/20, or 60%, of the
ungrammatical sentences remained ungrammatical. As would be ex-
pected, this latter group was better at actual correction. Interesting to
note is the decrease in incorrect changes in Group 1 as compared with
Group 2 (25% to 20%), and the concomitant increase in corrections
(21.2% to 40%). This may be interpreted as a greater ability by the more
proficient group to “monitor” their own output (Chaudron, personal
communication).
To summarize thus far, we have found:
1. Advanced learners judged fewer of their own sentences gram-
matical than did the intermediate learners.
2. From the point of view of English, the intermediate group was
better able to accurately recognize their own grammatical sentences
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3.
than their ungrammatical sentences. The abilities of the advanced
group are about equal in this area.
When considering only the group of sentences judged ungrammati-
cal (L) and the changes made to those sentences, we found that
those sentences which, from an English standard, were grammatical
remained grammatical after the change while those sentences which,
from an English standard, were ungrammatical remained ungram-
matical after the change.
DISCUSSION
Bialystok’s notion (1979, 1981) of two types of linguistic knowledge
provides a framework for the discussion and interpretation of these
results. She proposed that language proficiency involves a number of
disparate skills which can best be investigated by considering the
amount of control that a learner has over target language knowledge.
Different information is required for different aspects of language use.
Language information can be viewed along two dimensions: one is the
explicit/implicit dimension, reflecting the learner’s ability to view the
language information as an abstract entity; the second is the automat-
ic/analyzed dimension, reflecting the learner’s ability to access the
language information fluently and automatically (as opposed to with
difficulty and deliberation). Bialystok further stated that simple gram-
maticality judgment tasks reflect information about implicit knowl-
edge, but that additional tasks, such as correction of errors, reflect
explicit analyzed knowledge. Following this line of argumentation, we
see that in terms of implicit knowledge, as determined by the ability of
these learners to recognize their own correct and incorrect sentences,
there is little difference between the two groups (see Table 2). In other
words, there is little change in terms of implicit knowledge as a
function of proficiency. However, as we shall see, the situation is by no
means the same for what might be termed explicit knowledge. To
investigate the relationship between explicit knowledge and proficien-
cy, it is useful to consider those sentences which were ungrammatical
from an English standard, and which the students also designated
ungrammatical, in order to see what sorts of corrections were made.
Sentences were first counted to see how many of the ungrammatical
(E) sentences were actually marked ungrammatical (L). These results
are presented in Table 5.
The intermediate group recognized as ungrammatical (L) 68% and
the advanced group 68.9% of the ungrammatical (E) sentences. The
next step involved looking at how many of the corrections made
actually resulted in grammatical English sentences. As can be seen, for
Group 1, 34 were correctly identified but only 7 of those were correct-
ly changed. For Group 2,20 were identified as ungrammatical, with 8
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TABLE 5
Recognition and Correction of Ungrammatical (E] Sentences
Group 1 (Intermediate)
Total Number of Ungrammatical(E) Sentences 50
Number of Sentences Recognized as
Ungrammatical (L) 34 = 68%
Of Those Sentences Recognized as
Ungrammatical (L), Total Number Appropriately
Corrected
n = 331 7 = 21.2%
Of Those Inappropriately Corrected, Number of
Sentences Which Came Close (i.e., targeted
in on the incorrect area)
n=26 7 = 26.9%
1 One student marked one of his sentences ungrammatical, but failed to make any corrections,
Group 2 (Advanced)
Total Number of Ungrammatical (E) Sentences 34
Number of Sentences Recognized as
Ungrammatical (L) 20 = 68.9%
Of Those Sentences Recognized as
Ungrammatical (L), Total Number Appropriately
Corrected 8 = 40%
n=20
Of Those Inappropriately Corrected, Number of
Sentences Which Came Close (i.e., targeted
in on the incorrect area) 8 = 66.7%
n=12
of those being correctly changed. Thus, for the intermediate group
there were 26 sentences and for the advanced group 12 sentences
which had been identified by the learners as being incorrect and which
had been “corrected,” or so they believed, but which were still
ungrammatical (E). Within this last group of sentences I counted the
number of sentences in which the correction, while not resulting in a
grammatical sentence, nonetheless came close to the trouble area. The
example below will make this last category clearer.
Original sentence: If I dare to choose one person, I would like to be a
my teacher in my elementary school.
Corrected sentence: If I dare to choose one person, I would like to be
the teacher of mine in my elementary school.
In this particular example, one might speculate that the learner (a
Japanese speaker) felt that there was something wrong with the
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modifier, even though he did not know what the correct form should
be. Within the intermediate proficiency group 7/26 (26.9%) of the
ungrammatical sentences which were not appropriately corrected
nevertheless had corrections which targeted in on the trouble area,
while the more advanced speakers targeted in on 8 out of 12 (66.7%).
What is involved in recognizing an ungrammatical sentence as un-
grammatical? Clearly it cannot only be a matter of recognizing the
precise error and knowing how to correct it, for if this were the case
there would not have been an error in the first place. It seems that
learners have a general, what in German might be called Gefühl, “feel”
(see Krashen 1976, Bialystok 1979, 1981) for the grammaticality of a
sentence as a whole even though they cannot articulate precisely, nor
even recognize, where or what the trouble area is.
As Bialystok notes, “sentences sound right for reasons that may be
completely obscure and in these cases justifications for the decisions
can rarely be found” (1981:37). The results presented here corroborate
this finding. Sentences “felt” wrong to the students without their
having an accurate idea of why they were wrong. It is suggested here
that part of what is involved in becoming more proficient in a second
language is the progression from more gestalt-like to analytical analy-
ses. We might further speculate that indeed the analyzed aspect is a
necessary precondition for fluency in an L2, more so than for an L1.3
We find, then, that there is not as great an increase in the range of
Sprachgefühl, “one’s feel for the language,” as a function of proficiency
as there is an increase in ability to pinpoint the trouble spot and to
specifically recognize what is wrong. Learners’ analyzed knowledge develops
much more rapidly as a function of proficiency. A similar phenomenon
has been noted for children. With regard to progression in learning,
Gleitman, Gleitman, and Shipley (1972) have found that in relation to
word order, children first learn to detect grammatical violations and
only later to correct them. It seems that initially learners have a general
feeling of what is right/wrong without being able to zero in on the
precise nature of the error when there is one. We, therefore, suggest
that learners are first able to make a gestalt-type analysis of sentence
structure before they are able to make detailed analytic judgments
(also see Reber and Lewis 1977).
3 The importance of analysis for L2 development has been suggested with regard to language
transfer (Gass 1983, Gass and Selinker, in press). In considering the influence of the native
language on L2 acquisition, I suggested that there may be two types of influence—one which is
automatic and the other which requires more analysis and decision making on the part of the
learner. Recent theories of transfer (e.g., Kellerman 1979, in press) suggest that transfer is a
psycholinguistic process, based in part on learners’ perceptions of language distance (between
the L1 and the L2) and differences in language specificity/language universality. However,
before learners are abIe to deal with perceptions of the type Kellerman has suggested, it may be
the case that a certain amount of awareness or capacity for analyis is necessary.
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At this point, we can set up a tentative description of the develop-
ment of linguistic intuitions of second language learners. The initial
stages represent the development of a generalized feeling of what is
right or wrong. This continues to be refined so that more accurate
assessments can be made. In other words, we note a gradual change
from implicit to explicit knowledge, where explicit knowledge reflects
a learner’s ability to view the language as an abstract entity (but this
does not necessarily entail the ability to explicitly state the rule and, in
this sense, crucially differs from Krashen’s [1976] concept of learning).
Weidner (personal communication) has noted a phenomenon for
both native and non-native speakers similar to the one noted above.
She has found that when people read their own compositions aloud
they stumble or hesitate at points in which there is an error even
though, when asked, they often are unable to state what the error is or
how to correct it. She uses this as a technique for self-editing.
The findings of this study are corroborated by research on the
composing process, research based on native speakers. In dealing with
revisions in compositions, Bartlett (1982) found that there are essential-
ly three stages which writers go through in correcting errors. First, they
notice that there is something wrong. Second, they identify the kind of
problem, and third, they correct the error. She notes that corrections
come about only as a result of awareness (at some level) that some-
thing is incorrect. Moreover, it is explicit knowledge which is required
to carry out the demands that are necessary for revising. These stages
parallel the ones found in the development of intuitions in second
language learners, where we have suggested that with an increase in
proficiency comes a concomitant increase in explicit knowledge.
In a series of studies (Reber 1976, Reber and Lewis 1977, Reber and
Allen 1978) subjects were asked to give acceptability judgments about
strings of letters (varying from 3 to 8) which had been generated by a
finite state grammar. After each trial and before the next, they were
given feedback as to whether their responses were correct or not.
While they could not articulate the rule system which governed their
choices of acceptable/unacceptable strings, their responses did reach a
high level of accuracy. This is perhaps akin to, the situation which
non-proficient learners face. They have a generalized sense of Sprach-
gefühl (or, in Bialystok’s framework, are using implicit knowledge),
but lack the ability to either explicitly or even implicitly recognize the
trouble spot.
Let us turn finally to what is perhaps the most interesting question,
yet unfortunately the most speculative: what is the function of meta-
linguistic awareness for L2 learners? What purpose can we attribute to
intuitions about an L2? As mentioned, the development noted in this
study is not dissimilar to that which has been found for children.
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Sinclair, Jarvella, and Levelt (1978) speculate that for children there
may be at least two functions for linguistic awareness. According to
them, the functions of metalinguistic abilities are the facilitative role
they play in 1) face-to-face communication, and in 2) learning to
communicate. In face-to-face communication the ability to think about
one’s language is necessary when failures in the communication have
occurred. These conscious repairs can keep the conversation from
breaking down even further. We may see this even in speaking
(whether in an interaction or in a lecture-type situation). If the
automatic procedures “break down, ” we may begin to think more
consciously about our speech to prevent any further deterioration. In
other words, we pay closer attention to our speech in order to get us
out of the impasse we have gotten ourselves into.
Sinclair, Jarvella, and Levelt (1978) further add that the ability to
think about language may have a function in the acquisition proper of
communicative skills. The evidence, however, is not conclusive. Read
(1978) has shown that there is some deterioration in phonetic judgments
as a function of age, but conflicting evidence comes from Zei (1979),
who compared five and nine year olds in their abilities to explain the
articulatory events used in speaking. Admittedly, the ability to explain
articulatory events may be quite different from the ability to explain
other aspects of grammatical knowledge. Nonetheless, the evidence is
unclear as to what the precise functions of metalinguistic awareness are
for children and what role it plays in acquisition.
Assuming, however, that Sinclair, Jarvella, and Levelt (1978) are
correct that awareness serves a communicative function, we can
hypothesize that it serves a similar function for adults. It allows
learners to reflect upon the language and to make hypotheses about the
target language and subsequently modify those hypotheses. In addi-
tion, it affords an opportunity to make comparisons between target
language and native language and other languages the learner may be
familiar with, allowing manipulation of the target language so as to
avoid unfamiliar or difficult structures or to transfer potentially
successful elements of the native language, as has been suggested by
Kellerman (1979, and in press).
CONCLUSION
It is tempting to suggest implications from this study for classroom
teaching. For example, if it is the case that advanced learners can more
frequently identify errors which learners of other native languages
have made than can intermediate learners (see Table 3: 87.5% vs. 12%),
then the use of peer-editing techniques may be somewhat less appro-
priate for some proficiency levels than for others. Furthermore, if it is
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the case that language learning develops from the whole to the detail,
with learners first getting a general notion of structures (perhaps
concentrating on meaning) and only later concentrating on discrete
syntactic points, then there may be places in the curriculum where
explicit grammatical instruction is conductive to learning and others
where it is not. But still, specific recommendations concerning teaching
are, at this point, premature and await research with a more pedagogi-
cal focus.
In conclusion, intuitional data, as a reflection of metalinguistic aware-
ness, are important in second language research both in and of
themselves for what they reveal about language learning, and also
because they provide us with a crucial aspect of a learner’s knowledge,
an aspect without which we cannot hope to gain a complete picture of
the second language acquisition process.
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